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NOTE
Beyond Partisan Policy: The Eleventh Circuit Lays
Aside the Parol Evidence Rule in Pursuit of
International Uniformity in Commercial Regulation
I. Introduction
One of the most significant barriers to effective international
trade has been the conflict of laws inherent to the existence of
different national legal systems among commercial powers.' The
growing international character of commerce has led to the
interaction of companies whose parent countries differ in theories
• • 2
of contract interpretation. The United Nations sought to lessen
this uncertainty in international commercial agreements by
unifying worldwide standards for interpreting contracts for the
international sale of goods3 with the enactment of the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (Convention or CISG).
The CISG sets out substantive law "to govern the formation of
international sales contracts and the rights and obligations of the
buyer and seller."5  The Convention's goal is to adopt uniform
See FRITz ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW:
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS,
CONVENTION ON THE LIMITATION PERIOD IN THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 1
(1992).
2 See THOMAS R. VAN DERVORT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION: AN
INTRODUCTION 144-45 (1998) ("Some of the most serious... concerns of international
risk management to business interests involve how to engage in contractual negotiations
that stipulate the ground rules for settlement of disputes between contracting parties.").
3 See id. at 155.
4 See id.; U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr.
11, 1980, 347, 19 I.L.M. 671 (1980), reprinted in 15 U.S.C.A. app. 332 (1998)
[hereinafter CISG with all references to specific page numbers of the CISG cited to 15
U.S.C.A. app.].
' CISG, supra note 4, at 332; see also Letter of Transmittal from Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States, to United States Senate (Sept. 21, 1983), reprinted in 15
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 24
rules which "take into account the different social, economic and
legal systems" of all signatories to the treaty.6 Harmonizing the
different theories of contract interpretation practiced by common
law countries, such as the United States, with the civil code
practices of continental Europe, is one of the major issues to be
resolved by the CISG.7 The method employed to achieve this
uniformity requires a compromise among tribunals interpreting the
CISG: common law judges, accustomed to following precedent
when making a decision, are required to consider the international
objectives of the CISG, while civil code justices, who normally
rely upon legislative history and the general principles behind a
treaty, are instructed to consider international case law.8 To be
successful, the CISG requires that its "rules and terms.., be given
U.S.C.A. app. at 362-63 (1998) [hereinafter Letter] ("The Convention would unify the
law for international sales, as our Uniform Commercial Code in Article 2 unifies the law
for domestic sales."). However the CISG excludes:
consumer goods sold for personal, family, or household use; goods bought at
auction; stocks, securities, negotiable instruments, or money; ships, vessels, or
aircraft; electricity; assembly contracts for the supply of goods to be
manufactured or produced; contracts for the supply of labor or other services;
products liability; and contracts in which the parties choose to be bound by
some other law.
VAN DERVORT, supra note 2, at 155; see also CISG, arts. 2-5, supra note 4 (containing
enumerated exclusions from the treaty's application). The text of Article 6 states that
"[t]he parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to article 12,
derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions." CISG, art. 6, supra note 4.
See generally ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note I, at 48-51 (discussing the opportunity
for parties to exclude, vary, or derogate from the terms of the CISG through Article 6).
6 CISG, supra note 4, at 334.
7 See VAN DERVORT, supra note 2, at 155.
8 See Larry A. DiMatteo, The CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability:
Unintended Contractual Liability in International Business Dealings, 22 YALE J. INT'L
L. 111, 133 (1997).
According to DiMatteo,
[i]t is common knowledge that common law judges seem traditionally less
willing to take recourse to prepatory materials or to refer to the genesis of a
statute .... [In contrast,] civil law judges are more willing to refer to the
prepatory work or legal history of a text than their common law colleagues
... Continental European judges are far less scrupulous about taking a
functional approach than their English or American counterparts.
Id. at 133 n.142 (citing KAZJAKI SONO, The Vienna Sales Convention: History and
Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 1, 7 (Petar Sercevic & Paul Volken eds.,
1986)).
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original interpretation;... [domestic] meanings taken from
national legal systems are to be abandoned in favor of independent
meanings consistent with the Convention's objectives."9
One major area of difficulty surrounding the application of the
CISG is that that no single body "has jurisdiction to make binding
rulings interpreting the [Convention]."' ° Thus, the CISG mandate
to abandon domestic precedent and rely upon international case
law without providing a tribunal capable of making binding
interpretations of CISG provisions has been described by one
writer as being demonstrative of "acute legal schizophrenia.""
Practitioners fear that inconsistent interpretations of the CISG by
courts applying the domestic law of their national forum will
undermine the Convention's goal of international uniformity,
ultimately destroying the effectiveness of the treaty.12
A potential problem of interpretation arose in MCC-Marble
Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.p.A., 3
where the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was faced
with the question of whether the parol evidence rule applied in
CISG cases. 14  The court found that it had little domestic or
international precedent to rely upon in deciding the issue. 5 The
issue was compounded by the Convention's international scope
and its directive that the CISG's provisions be interpreted
according to the observance of good faith in the promotion of
international trade.16
I DiMatteo, supra note 8, at 136.
10 REED KATHREIN & DANIEL MAGRAW, THE CONVENTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS: A HANDBOOK OF BASIC MATERIALS 11 (1990).
" DiMatteo, supra note 8, at 136.
12 See VAN DERVORT, supra note 2, at 156.
13 144 F.3d 1384 (11 th Cir. 1998).
14 See id. at 1388.
15 See id. at 1390.
16 See id. at 1390-91 n.18. Specifically, Article 7 of the CISG provides that:
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application
and the observance of good faith in international trade.
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
In MCC-Marble the Eleventh Circuit held that the Convention
rejected the parol evidence rule. 7  In so ruling, the court
established clear domestic precedent that upholds the international
policy goals of the Convention: "[tlo provide parties to
international contracts for the sale of goods with some degree of
certainty as to the principles of law that would govern potential
disputes and remove the previous doubt regarding which party's
legal system might otherwise apply."' 8  The Eleventh Circuit's
decision to uphold the goal of uniformity in the regulation of
international trade serves as an example not only to other U.S.
courts applying the CISG but also to the tribunal of every nation
that is party to the Convention.
Part I of this Note describes the facts and holdings of the
Eleventh Circuit MCC-Marble decision.'9 Part Ill summarizes the
relevant background law which provided the basis for the Eleventh
Circuit's reasoning in MCC-Marble. ° Part IV discusses the
significance of the decision in MCC-Marble,2 and finally, Part V
of this Note concludes that the Eleventh Circuit's well-reasoned
decision will serve to promote uniformity in the regulation of
international trade and elevate the United States' standing among
the countries that are party to the Convention.22
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts and Procedural History
MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. (MCC), a Florida
corporation engaged in the sale of tiles, filed suit against Ceramica
Nuova D'Agostino, S.p.A. (D'Agostino), an Italian tile
manufacturer, in the United States District Court for the Southern
on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the
law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.
CISG, art. 7, supra note 4, at 336 [hereinafter Article 7].
17 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1390.
"8 Id. at 1391.
'9 See infra notes 23-60 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 61-126 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 127-46 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 24
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District of Florida. 3 In its complaint, MCC alleged breach of the
contract for the sale of tiles. 4 D'Agostino responded that it had no
obligation to perform under the contract because MCC had
defaulted on payments for previous shipments. 5 In support of its
assertion, D'Agostino relied upon terms found on the reverse side
of the forms that the parties utilized to execute their, agreement.
26
Directly below the signature of MCC president Juan Carlos
Monzon (Monzon), the contract read ,27 "the buyer hereby states
that he is aware of the sales conditions stated on the reverse and
that he expressly approves of them with special reference to those
numbered 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8 . Clause 6(b) printed on the back of
the form explicitly reserved D'Agostino the right to cancel any
pending contracts with MCC if MCC defaulted on a payment."
In addition to its defenses, D'Agostino filed counterclaims
against MCC seeking damages for alleged nonpayment of previous
deliveries.3 ° MCC responded that those deliveries were of low
quality, and, therefore, the CISG entitled MCC to a reduction in
23 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1385.
24 See id. On appeal MCC alleged that the parties entered into a requirements
contract in February of 1991. See id. MCC received the benefit of that contention
because it was the non-moving party on the motion for summary judgment. See id. at
1385 n.2.
25 See id. at 1385 & n.2; see also infra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing
right to cancellation of contract where there is a default of payment).
26 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1385.
27 See id. at 1385-86. The form contract was drafted entirely in Italian, which
Monzon did not speak. See id. at 1385. However, D'Agostino presented MCC with an
English translation of the contract which MCC never challenged as inaccurate. See id. at
1386 n.3. The court refused to consider MCC's suggestion that the contract should not
be enforced due to Monzon's inability to comprehend Italian, noting that "a person who
is... unfamiliar with the language in which a contract is written and who has signed a
document which was not read to him ... is bound." Id. at 1387 n.9 (quoting Samson
Plastic Conduit & Pipe Corp. v. Battenfeld Extrusionstechnik GMBH, 718 F. Supp. 886,
890 (M.D. Ala. 1989)).
28 Id. at 1386.
29 See id. ("[D]efault or delay in payment within the time agreed upon gives
D'Agostino the right to... suspend or cancel the contract itself and to cancel possible
other pending contracts .....
30 See id.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
price.3 Although evidence existed that MCC complained about
the defects to D'Agostino, MCC never submitted a written
complaint to D'Agostino.32 D'Agostino then referred to Clause 4
of the contract, also printed on the back of 'the form, which read:
"Possible complaints for defects of the merchandise must be made
in writing."33
MCC did not dispute D'Agostino's version of the facts but
instead claimed that the parties never intended for the terms on the
back of the forms to apply to their agreement.14 In support of its
position, MCC produced affidavits from MCC's President,
Monzon, and from two of D'Agostino's representatives who
negotiated the contract on D'Agostino's behalf.35 All three
affidavits asserted that MCC subjectively intended not to be bound
by the terms on the reverse side of the contract forms and that
D'Agostino was aware of MCC's subjective intent not to be bound
by those terms.36 The district court, however, ruled that the parol
evidence rule applied.37 Therefore, the court held that even if the
affidavits were true, they did not raise an issue of material fact
regarding the interpretation of the contract or the applicability of
the terms printed on the reverse side of the form.38 The district
court then granted D'Agostino's motion for summary judgment,
and MCC instituted its appeal.39
B. The Eleventh Circuit's Decision
In its de novo review of the district court's grant of summary
judgment for D'Agostino, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
31 See id.; see also CISG, art. 50, supra note 4, at 347 (entitling a buyer of non-
conforming goods to a proportional discount in price). The parties agreed that the CISG
governed this case since the parties to the dispute each have their place of business in a
nation party to the Convention. See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1386.
32 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1386.
33 Id.
34 See id.
" See id.
36 See id.
17 See id. at 1387.
38 See id. at 1386.
31 See id.
[Vol. 24
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considered: (1) whether the lower court improperly ignored
MCC's affidavits, and (2) whether the parol evidence rule was
improperly applied "in derogation of the CISG.'4°
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the CISG controlled the
dispute,41 particularly Article 8, which governs the interpretation of
statements and conduct of parties to an international contract for
the sale of goods.42 The court found that, contrary to U.S. law,43
Article 8(1) required the court to consider evidence of a party's
subjective intent to contract when the other party to the contract
was aware of that intent.44 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit decided that
Article 8(1) required the lower court to consider evidence of
subjective intent to interpret both the statements and the conduct
of the parties. 45 The court found that MCC's affidavits constituted
evidence that D'Agostino was aware of MCC's subjective intent
not to be bound by the terms on the back of the forms.46 Therefore,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the lower court was incorrect in
40 Id. at 1386-87.
41 See id. (citing CISG, art. 1, supra note 4, at 334-35); see also supra note 31
(discussing the parties' agreement that the CISG governed this dispute).
42 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1386-87. Article 8 states:
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other conduct
of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the other party
knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and other
conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had in the
same circumstances.
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable
person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant
circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the
parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent
conduct of the parties.
CISG, art. 8, supra note 4, at 336 [hereinafter Article 8].
43 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1387 n.8. Citing various authorities, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that U.S. legislatures, courts, and legal theorists expressed a preference for
relying on objective evidence of a party's intent to contract. See id.
4 See id. at 1387; see also Article 8(1), supra note 42 (enumerating the language
of Article 8(1)).
45 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1388.
46 See id.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
refusing to consider MCC's evidence.47
The court then addressed the question of whether the parol
evidence rule applied in CISG cases. 48  After noting that the
question was one of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, the
court addressed the nature of the parol evidence rule. 49 The court
observed that the parol evidence rule was a substantive rule of law
and not a rule of evidence to be applied as a matter of procedure. °
Considering the importance of parties' conduct under Article 8(1),
the Eleventh Circuit read Article 8(3) as "a clear instruction to
admit and consider parol evidence regarding the negotiations to
the extent they reveal the parties' subjective intent."5' Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit found that the Convention rejected the parol
evidence rule.52 While the court noted that "surprisingly few cases
have applied the Convention in the United States,"53 it found that
the "great weight of academic commentary" supported its
opinion.
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit explained that the exclusion
of the parol evidence rule by the CISG would not always prevent
parties from obtaining summary judgment.5 The court reasoned
that most cases would not present the situation where both parties
would testify to a subjective intent not to be bound by certain
terms of their contract.56 Thus, the court noted that Article 8(2) of
the Convention, rather than Article 8(1), would govern the
majority of cases and require objective proof of the party's
subjective intent in order to sustain a motion for summary
41 See id.
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 See id. at 1388-89 (citing 2 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS § 7.2, at 194 (1990)); see also infra note 86 and accompanying text
(distinguishing substantive rules of law and rules of evidence).
"' MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1389; see also Article 8, supra note 42 (enumerating
the language of Article 8(3)).
52 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1390.
51 Id. at 1389.
14 Id. at 1390-91.
5 See id. at 1391.
56 See id.
[Vol. 24
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judgment.57  The court also suggested that the inclusion of a
standard merger clause would preclude the admissibility of parol
evidence in contracts governed by the CISG.58
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit made clear that its ruling was
rendered in order to "achieve the directives of good faith and
uniformity in contracts under the CISG by interpreting and
applying the plain language of Article 8(3) as written and obeying
its directive to consider this type of parol evidence."59 Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings,
reasoning that MCC's evidence presented a genuine issue
regarding the parties' intent to be bound by the terms on the back
of their contract.6°
III. Background Law
In MCC-Marble, the Eleventh Circuit was faced with
interpreting the CISG despite a lack of precedent.6' Ultimately, the
court relied on the objectives of the CISG 62 and academic
commentary in reaching its decision.63
A. CISG and Treaty Interpretation
The CISG governs contracts for the international sale of goods
57 See id. (citing JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER
THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION § 107, at 164-65 (2d ed. 1991)); see also Article
8(2), supra note 42 (enumerating the language of Article 8(2)).
58 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1391 n.19 (citing I. ALBERT KRITZER, GUIDE TO
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 125 (1989)); see also Harry M. Flechtner, Symposium,
Ten Years of the United Nations Sales Convention: The Several Texts of the CISG in a
Decentralized System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and Other
Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & COM. 187, 201-03
(1998) (discussing the usage of merger clauses in contracts governed by the CISG).
'9 MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1391 n.19.
o See id. at 1392-93. The court explained that while the affidavits were sufficient
for MCC to withstand D'Agostino's motion for summary judgment, they were not
conclusive of the parties' intent. See id. at 1392. Therefore, the affiants' credibility
should be judged by the finder of fact. See id.
61 See id. at 1389 n.14.
62 See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
63 See infra notes 104-26 and accompanying text.
1998]
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between parties whose places of business are in different signatory
countries.64 The Convention is the product of over fifty years of
effort by various international organizations pursuing the goal of
international uniformity in commercial regulation.6 ' The United
States and Italy, among other countries, ratified the Convention on
December 11, 1986,66 and the CISG became effective on January
1, 1988.67 Pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, the treaty became
binding on U.S. courts upon ratification.68  Therefore, the
"substantive international law of contract embodied in the
[CISG] '69 applied to the facts of MCC-Marble. °
The Convention's objective was to adopt uniform rules to
govern international trade that would "take into account the
different social, economic and legal systems" of the parties to the
Convention in order to promote the development of international
trade.7 ' The Convention sought to promote "equality and mutual
benefit"72 among its members through "enhancing legal certainty
I See CISG, art. I, supra note 4, at 335; Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp.,
789 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[T]he Convention governs... contracts
between parties with places of business in different nations, so long as both nations are
signatories of the Convention.").
65 See VAN DERVORT, supra note 2, at 155.
66 See CISG, supra note 4, at 361-62 (listing signatory nations to the Convention).
Neither Japan nor Great Britain are signatory countries. See id; see also DiMatteo,
supra note 8, at 113 n.9 (noting that the United Kingdom is not among the states party to
the Convention).
67 See CISG, supra note 4, at 332.
61 See Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1237 n.5 (relying on Havenstein v. Lynham, 100
U.S. 483, 490 (1880)) ("[T]he Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States are as
much a part of the law of every state as its own local laws and Constitution."); see also
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The ratification of the CISG was the first time in U.S. history
that a treaty had been used to enact a private law, a power normally reserved to the
States. See VAN DERVORT, supra note 2, at 155.
69 Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1237.
70 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d 1384, 1385 (11 th Cir. 1998) (noting that the parties
to the dispute each have their place of business in a different signatory nation). A
contract for the commercial sale of tiles is not among the convention's exclusions. See
supra note 5 (enumerating CISG exclusions).
71 CISG, supra note 4, at 334.
72 Id.
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for international sales contracts. 3
Generally, there exist two primary sources to guide the
interpretation of international law: (1) international agreements,
and (2) customary international law.74 Unfortunately, neither
source proved useful to the Eleventh Circuit in its evaluation of
MCC-Marble. The dominant international agreement addressing
the interpretation of treaties is the Vienna Convention, Articles 3 1,
32, and 33.7. The United States, however, is not a party to the
Vienna Convention, and, therefore, the Eleventh Circuit was not
76bound by its guidelines. Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit noted
the lack of international judicial decisions on point, leaving the
court with little persuasive customary international law to assist in
its interpretation of the Convention.77
The CISG itself, however, provides some guidance for the
interpretation of its provisions. Article 7 of the CISG explicitly
73 Letter, supra note 5, at 363.
74 See KATHREIN & MAGRAW, supra note 10, at 6. Domestic guidelines, however,
did exist for treaty interpretation. Section 325 of the Revised Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States was modeled on portions of the Vienna Convention's
provisions regarding treaty interpretation. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325 (tent. Final Draft 1985) [hereinafter
Restatement]. Section 325 of the Restatement urges courts to interpret international
treaties in accordance with the ordinary meaning of their terms and in light of the treaty's
object and purpose. See id. The Restatement also requires subsequent agreements or
practice between the parties to be taken into account when interpreting the treaty. See id.
While the Restatement calls for an objective approach when interpreting international
agreements, the U.S. Supreme Court prefers a more subjective approach. See id; see
also KATHREIN & MAGRAW, supra note 10, at 6 (noting that the Restatement aims for an
objective approach to treaty interpretation through directing courts to ascertain the
meaning of treaty text and to give effect to that meaning). In Air France v. Saks, the
U.S. Supreme Court explained that "[iun interpreting a treaty, it is proper, of course, to
refer to the records of its drafting and negotiation." 470 U.S. 392, 400 (1985). The
Supreme Court thus concluded that the intent of the framing parties should be
considered when interpreting an international treaty. See id. But cf supra note 8 and
accompanying text (noting that common law systems do not usually consider legislative
materials when interpreting treaties).
75 See KATHREIN & MAGRAW, supra note 10, at 6.
76 See id. at 6-7.
7 See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.p.A., 144
F.3d 1384, 1390 n.14 (11 th Cir. 1998); see also KATHREIN & MAGRAW, supra note 10,
at 6-7 (noting that, despite some argument to the contrary, the Vienna Convention
should not be considered reflective of customary international law).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
calls for a teleological approach when interpreting the
Convention. Article 7 requires that courts give "regard ... to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its
application and the observance of good faith in international
trade."79 Article 7 also makes clear that "[q]uestions concerning
matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly
settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general
principles on which it is based."80 Thus, the CISG urges that any
interpretation of its provisions be made according to the
Convention's overall purpose of uniformity in international
commercial regulation.8
B. The Parol Evidence Rule and the CISG
In the United States, the parol evidence rule exists as a
common law principle82 and as a statutory provision of the UCC.83
The rule bars extrinsic evidence used to contradict the written
terms of an agreement. 4 Additionally, the rule may bar the use of
extrinsic evidence to supplement the terms of an agreement.
85
However, the parol "evidence" rule is somewhat of a misnomer, as
the rule is one of substantive law and not a procedural rule of
evidence.86
78 See Article 7(1), supra note 16; see generally KATHREIN & MAGRAW, supra note
10, at 6-11 (noting that the subjective, objective, and teleological methods of treaty
interpretation are not mutually exclusive).
79 Article 7(1), supra note 16.
80 Article 7(2), supra note 16.
81 See id.; MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1387.
82 See Cipriano v. Triad Mechanical, Inc., 925 P.2d 918, 922 (Or. Ct. App. 1996);
Gianni v. R. Russell & Co., 125 A. 791, 792 (Pa. 1924); see also United States v.
Service Engineering Co., No. C-93-2591-VRW, No. C-94-0271-VRW, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13596, at *19-22 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 1994) (summarizing cases that apply the
federal common law of the parol evidence rule).
83 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202 (1997).
84 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 50, at 192.
85 See id.
86 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1388-89 (11th Cir. 1998). The distinction
between substantive law and an evidentiary rule is crucial because if the parol evidence
rule was an evidentiary rule, it would be applicable as a Federal Rule of Evidence in a
U.S. district court. See id. at 1389 (citing FARNSWORTH, supra note 50, at 196).
However, since the rule is substantive in nature, the Eleventh Circuit needed to
[Vol. 24
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The rule has suffered heavy criticism, and some academic
authority celebrated the CISG for discarding the "embarrassment"
871
of the rule's application." Professor John Honnold,88 who has
written extensively on the CISG, concluded that the parol evidence
89
rule does not apply to contracts governed by the Convention.
Professor Honnold reasoned that the language of Article 8(3),
which reads that "due consideration is to be given to all relevant
circumstances of the case," is sufficient to bar the application of
the parol evidence rule under the CISG.90
While the parol evidence rule is applicable in many domestic
contract cases,9' U.S. courts have been uncertain whether the parol
evidence rule applies under the CISG.92 The issue was raised in
dicta for the first time by the Southern District of New York in
Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp.93 In deciding an issue of
offer and acceptance in a case governed by the Convention, the
court noted that Article 8(3) of the CISG "essentially rejects both
the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule., 94  Filanto
briefly mentioned its interpretation of Article 8(3) as excluding the
parol evidence rule only to illustrate its contention that "[the
CISG] varies from the UCC in many significant ways."95 Filanto
determine whether it was applicable under the CISG as the controlling law of the case.
See id. at 1388-89.
87 See HONNOLD, supra note 57, at 171.
88 John Honnold's credentials include Schnader Professor of Commercial Law at
the University of Pennsylvania and Goodhart Professor of the Science of Law at the
University of Cambridge. See id. at 3.
89 See id. at 171.
90 Id. at 170-71 (citing Article 8(3), supra note 42).
9 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
92 See Article 8, supra note 42 (making no explicit reference to the parol evidence
rule); MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d
1384, 1389 (11 th Cir. 1998) ("The CISG itself contains no express statement on the role
of parol evidence."); HONNOLD, supra note 57, at 170 ("Article 8 does not directly
address the parol evidence rule.").
93 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
94 id.
9' Id. at 1238. Filanto held that the CISG reversed the offer and acceptance rule of
the UCC and applied the common law rule instead. See id. In support of this holding,
the court remarked, in dicta, that the CISG also rejected the Statute of Frauds and the
parol evidence rule. See id. at n.7.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
made no analytical attempt to reconcile Article 8 with the parol
evidence rule, or to further explain its opinion that Article 8(3)
operated as a rejection of the rule.96
The question of whether the parol evidence rule applied to
CISG cases re-emerged in the Fifth Circuit case Beijing Metals &
Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American Business Center.97 In
Beijing Metals, MMB, an exercise equipment manufacturer
located in China,98 won its motion for summary judgment on a
claim for breach of contract against ABC, a Texas corporation.99
On appeal ABC sought to introduce parol evidence of two
previous oral agreements as a defense to its obligations under the
contract.'00 ABC argued that the lower court should not have
applied the parol evidence rule since the case was governed by the
CISG.'°' However, without explaining its reasoning, the Fifth
Circuit decided that Texas law, and not the CISG, applied to the
case.'02 The court went on to indicate that the parol evidence rule
would have applied "regardless" of which law governed.'O3
96 See id.
97 993 F.2d 1178, 1182 n.9 (5th Cir. 1993).
98 China is a signatory country to the CISG. See CISG, supra note 4, at 361-62.
9' See id.; MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.p.A.,
144 F.3d 1384, 1389 n.14 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that the exact location of ABC's
business is not explicitly clear, but inferred through the text). The United States and
China are both nations party to the Convention and are therefore subject to the CISG.
See CISG, supra note 4, at 361-62.
00 See Beijing Metals, 993 F.2d at 1182. In addition to arguing a misapplication of
the parol evidence rule, ABC raised the defenses of duress and fraud. See id. at 1184-85.
'o' See id. at 1182 n.9.
102 See id. Nothing in the opinion suggests that the parties had a choice of law
clause to displace the CISG. See id.
'0' See id. The Fifth Circuit also found that the disputed contract was not for the
sale of goods. See id. at 1183 n.10 (finding that the contract resembles a settlement
agreement). This finding was crucial in that the CISG only applies to international
contracts for the sale of goods. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Thus, the Fifth
Circuit suggested that the contract in Beijing Metals might have fallen outside the scope
of the CISG despite the court's choice of law decision. See Beijing Metals, 993 F.2d at
1183 n.10. But see Harry M. Flechtner, Recent Developments: CISG. More U.S.
Decisions on the U.N. Sales Convention. Scope, Parol Evidence, "Validity" and
Reduction of Price under Article 50, 14 J.L. & COM. 153, 163-65 (1995) (arguing that
the contract in Beijing Metals would have come within the scope of the CISG even if it
were a settlement agreement).
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C. Academic Commentary
The dicta in Beijing Metals, which construed the CISG and the
parol evidence rule as consistent,' soon sparked academic debate.
While Harry M. Flechtner, Professor of Law at the University of
Pittsburgh, acknowledged that "the approach to parol evidence
questions taken by the Fifth Circuit in Beijing Metals is
inconsistent with CISG,"'' 5 he argued that "the extent to which
CISG preempts the parol evidence rule is very limited indeed.',
0 6
Professor Flechtner contended that "while the parol evidence rule
may preclude evidence of distinct terms omitted from a writing,
modem formulations of the rule do not bar evidence of prior
negotiations introduced to aid in interpreting the writing.' 0 7
Essentially, Professor Flechtner proposed that Article 8's use of
prior negotiations as evidence of a party's intent in contracting
"addresses interpretive matters generally beyond the preclusive
scope of the parol evidence rule."'0 8 However, Professor Flechtner
found error in the Fifth Circuit's consideration of "special
procedures and tests" of the parol evidence rule unique to the U.S.
common law.' °9 Professor Flechtner thus condemned the Beijing
Metals court's application of a rule "encrusted by purely domestic
precedent" as violative of the international uniformity sought for
by the CISG."°
A recent academic writer disagreed with Professor Flechtner's
analysis and attempted to reconcile the CISG with the parol
o See 993 F.2d at 1182 n.9 ("We need not resolve this choice of law issue, because
our discussion is limited to application of the parol evidence rule (which applies
regardless)...").
105 Flechtner, supra note 103, at 158.
106 Id. at 157.
101 Id. at 158 (citations omitted).
108 Id.
'o Id. at 159. Professor Flechtner cites the "special procedures and tests" that arose
unique to U.S. common law as: (1) a presumption that a writing is an integration of the
parties' agreement, and (2) the "normally and naturally" test (whether the collateral
agreement was of the sort which would "normally and naturally" be reduced to writing).
Id.
"o Id. at 160.
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evidence rule."' David H. Moore argued that the parol evidence
rule operates initially as "a mere application of Article 8." ' He
suggested that an application of the parol evidence rule is
consistent with Article 8's instruction to give "due consideration
... to all relevant circumstances" regarding the parties' intent to
fully integrate their agreement." 3 Mr. Moore theorized that both
the parol evidence rule and Article 8 operate to exclude evidence
not relating to the parties' intent to fully integrate their
agreement. 14
Mr. Moore continued with a two-fold argument wherein he
construed the parol evidence rule as consistent with the
international uniformity called for in Article 7 of the CISG. '
First, he argued that most states party to the Convention assign the
task of contract interpretation to judges rather than to juries."6
Therefore, the application of the parol evidence rule requiring
judges to interpret parties' intent would bring "U.S. courts into
greater procedural harmony with courts of other nations in
applying the Convention.""' 7 Second, noting that the Convention
does not address the parol evidence rule, ' 8 the author proposed
that Article 7(2) of the Convention allows courts to apply their
forum's domestic law to matters not expressly settled within the
CISG." 9 The author suggested that as long as the domestic law
was (1) "in conformity with 'the Convention's underlying
principles,"' and (2) in accordance with the uniformity directive of
'" See David H. Moore, Note, The Parol Evidence Rule and the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Justifying Beijing Metals
& Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American Business Center, Inc., 1995 BYU L. REV.
1347, 1358 (1995). Mr. Moore appears to be the only writer to have made an attempt to
reconcile the CISG with the parol evidence rule. See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v.
Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1390 (11 th Cir. 1998).
112 Moore, supra note 111, at 1361 (citations omitted).
"I Ild. at 1363 (citing Article 8(3), supra note 42).
114 See id.
"' See id. at 1364-65; Article 7, supra note 16; supra notes 79-81 and
accompanying text.
116 See Moore, supra note 11, at 1365.
''7 Id. at 1366.
"' See id.
119 See id. at 1368; see also Article 7(2), supra note 16.
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Article 7(1), the CISG would allow its application to resolve
unsettled issues.' 20 Mr. Moore considered the parol evidence rule
to be a domestic law meeting these criteria, and, thus, in
conformity with the CISG.1
2
'
The inconsistencies of the United States' judicial
interpretations of the CISG have also been recognized by the
international community. For example, a renowned German
academic commentary on the CISG 122 recently suggested that the
Fifth Circuit misapplied the Convention in Beijing Metals. The
German criticism emphasized that "[d]omestic rules of
interpretation are ... overridden in so far as they recognize only
written declarations and do not permit proof that something else
was agreed orally or some other meaning intended."'23  The
German commentary further noted that, while there existed a
preference for written evidence of a party's contractual intent, the
parol evidence rule'24 could not restrict evidence of intent found in
conduct or oral representations. 125  Therefore, the dicta in Bejing
Metals which construed the parol evidence rule and the CISG as
consistent is considered "doubtful" by the German authority. 1
26
IV. Significance of the Case
The Eleventh Circuit, in holding that the parol evidence rule
does not apply to cases governed by the CISG, did not have the
120 Moore, supra note 111, at 1368 (citing Article 7(2), supra note 16).
121 See id.
122 Foreward COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS (CISG) (Peter Schlechtriem ed. & Geoffrey Thomas trans., Clarendon Press
2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter Commentary] (noting the purpose of the English translation is
to provide English readers with an understanding of how German jurists apply the
CISG). See Claire M. Germain, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: Guide to Research and Literature, in CORNELL REVIEW OF
THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 117, 124
(1995) (noting that the German Commentary was written by a member of the then-West
German delegation to the CISG Conference).
123 Commentary, Art. 11 § 13.
124 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-202 is cited as an example of the parol evidence
rule. See id.
125 See id.
126 See Commentary, Art. 11 § 13 n.35, supra note 122.
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benefit of international precedent to serve as a guide.2 1 Instead,
the court was faced with the burden of settling an issue of first
impression which would have ramifications on commercial law at
the international level.'28 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit
underwent a carefully reasoned, complete analysis of the issue
while considering the international interests at stake. 29 Although it
is likely, as the Eleventh Circuit noted, that most cases will be
governed by Article 8(2),13° MCC-Marble will add an element of
certainty to the application of the CISG in the United States.
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit's decision will serve to
facilitate international commercial transactions governed by the
CISG. By abandoning substantive domestic law in pursuit of
international uniformity, the Eleventh Circuit will make U.S. case
law more consistent with the Convention's goals. 3' The final
result of the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in MCC-Marble will have
two important effects: (1) the holding will serve as an important
precedent for U.S. federal courts when applying the CISG, and (2)
the decision will promote international trade through serving the
Convention's goal of international uniformity in commercial
regulation.
U.S. federal courts faced with the task of applying the CISG
tend to refer to familiar domestic law, particularly the UCC, to aid
in interpreting the provisions of the Convention. '3 2 While the UCC
127 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
128 See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.p.A., 144
F.3d 1384, 1388 (11 th Cir. 1998).
129 See id. at 1388-93.
130 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 41-47, 71-73 and accompanying text.
132 See Delchi Cartier, S.p.A. v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995)
(noting that case law interpreting analogous provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) may inform a court where the language of the CISG is similar but that such case
law is not per se applicable); Calzaturificio Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear, Ltd., No. 96-
C8052, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4586, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998) (citing Delchi
Carrier when noting that the UCC may sometimes aid in interpreting the CISG). The
reasoning in Claudia is nearly identical to that of MCC-Marble. The notable distinction
between the cases is that the Claudia analysis includes mention of the UCC's usefulness
when interpreting the CISG, where MCC-Marble does not. Compare Claudia, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *14 with MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d 1384.
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may be a tempting guide to federal judges unfamiliar with
international commercial law, it is not per se applicable to CISG133
cases. Not only is there a constitutional basis for the CISG's
displacement of the UCC in the area of international commercial
law, 34 but the United States also agreed to pursue uniformity in the
application of the CISG by virtue of its becoming a party to the
Convention."' In pursuing international uniformity in the
application of the CISG, it is incumbent upon all of its member
countries to "reduce the incidence of inconsistent interpretations of
the Convention"'36 through taking "into account the different
social, economic, and legal systems" '137 of other States that are
party to the Convention. Prior to MCC-Marble, the cases that
addressed the issue of the parol evidence rule within the CISG left
behind only inconsistency and confusion. 3
The Eleventh Circuit paid strict attention to its international
responsibility in its interpretation of the CISG'39  through
emphasizing the importance of setting aside familiar domestic law
in order to further international uniformity.'4 Instead of
categorizing the rejection of the parol evidence rule as a blunder, 4'
the Eleventh Circuit suggested that the Convention was a
"I See Orbisphere Corp. v. United States, 726 F. Supp. 1344, 1355 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1989) ("[T]he... UCC is not per se applicable [to a CISG case], and certainly not in the
abstract binding, on this Court.").
134 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
"I See CISG, supra note 4, at 334.
136 KATHREIN & MAGRAW, supra note 10, at 11.
137 CISG, supra note 4, at 334.
118 See supra notes 92-121 (discussing the inconsistencies of Filanto and Beijing
Metals regarding the parol evidence issue). But see Calzaturificio Claudia v. Olivieri
Footwear, Ltd., No. 96-C8052, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4586, at *14-18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
7, 1998) (holding that the parol evidence rule did not apply to facts similar to those of
MCC-Marble).
13 See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.p.A, 144
F.3d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998).
140 See id. at 1390.
141 See Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) ("[T]he [UCC], as previously noted does not apply to this case, because the State
Department undertook to fix something that was not broken by helping to create the
[CISG] which varies from the [UCC] in many significant ways.").
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progressive model for modem legislation. The court did this by
suggesting that the parol evidence rule was an "embarrassment for
the administration of modem transactions"'42 and noting that many
"States Party to the CISG have rejected the rule in their domestic
jurisdictions."' 43 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit paid deference to the
CISG and furthered its goal of promoting international trade by
ruling that the parol evidence rule did not apply to cases governed
by the Convention.'"
MCC-Marble's holding will serve as precedent for U.S.
courts' 45 faced with applying the CISG, particularly to cases falling
within the scope of Article 8(1) of the Convention. 46
V. Conclusion
The Eleventh Circuit's deferential interpretation of the CISG
147
will lead to increased U.S. attention on the international goals of
the Convention and a decreased concern about its departure from
U.S. substantive law. 48  The holding in MCC-Marble will also
reduce the reliance U.S. courts have on domestic law when
interpreting the provisions of the Convention. ' These will be the
results of the Eleventh Circuit's recognition that the provisions of
the CISG can effectively operate without need for intrusive
142 MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1390 (quoting HONNOLD, supra note 57, at 170-71).
143 Id. at 1391.
144 See id. The court employed a teleological approach to treaty interpretation and
reas6ned that the parol evidence rule was inconsistent with the international uniformity
called for in Article 7 of the Convention. See id.; see also supra notes 78-81 and
accompanying text (discussing the basis for a teleological approach to treaty
interpretation).
145 See KATHREIN & MAGRAW, supra note 10, at 10 (noting that one country's
interpretation of the CISG will not necessarily bind the courts of another country faced
with interpreting the Convention).
146 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1391 (stating that most cases will be governed by
Article 8(2) which requires objective evidence of a party's intent).
147 See id. (noting that the Convention requires the courts of signatory states to set
aside familiar principles of domestic law in order to achieve its directives of good faith
and uniformity in international commercial regulation).
148 See supra notes 95 and 141 and accompanying text.
149 See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
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application of U.S. domestic law. 50
Perhaps even more important will be MCC-Marble's effect on
international uniformity in the application of the CISG. Although
the Eleventh Circuit's decision will not have binding effect on the
courts of other states party to the Convention, the MCC-Marble
decision will certainly be recognized by other members of the
international community. The Eleventh Circuit's deference to the
international goal of the CISG will serve to heighten American
standing in the world of international trade and reinforce the
stability of international commercial contracts under the
Convention.
MICHAEL J. KOLOSKY
"I See DiMatteo, supra note 8, at 138 (emphasizing the need for courts to use the
CISG as a fully integrated statute, rather than relying upon the domestic law of their own
forum, in order to achieve international uniformity); see also HONNOLD, supra note 57,
at 171 (noting that the Convention, in excluding the parol evidence rule, does not
interfere with the allocation of authority between the judge and jury, and would not
interfere with the decision to exclude from a jury evidence of prior or contemporaneous
agreements if the court finds that the agreement was fully integrated).

